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State of Utah, Department of
Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services, and Child
Support Enforcement,

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

ORDER
Case No. 930654-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellant
and Appellee,
v,
Lee Allen Richards, et al.,
Defendants.
State of Utah, Department of
Human Services. Office of
Recovery Services, and Child
Support Enforcement,

Case No. 930804-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellant
and Appellee,
v.
Reyes Valentino Cordova,
Defendant.
This matter is before the court on appellant's motion for
summary disposition by published decision.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied and a ruling
on the issues raised is deferred under Utah R. App. P. 10(f)
until plenary presentation and consideration of the case, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned cases are
consolidated for purposes of decision and oral argument, which
will be scheduled on an expedited basis on the next available
oral argument calendar.
Dated this

day of September, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

•i221
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M . ~ B i l l i n g s , Prife^Tciing Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby cer fy that on the 15th day of Septemi; .-r, 1094 # a true
and correct c o y of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the
United States mail to the parties listed below:
Billy L. Walker
Annina M Mitchell
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham
State Attorney General
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1980

Craig S. Cook
Attorne r it Law
3645 East: 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
and
Michael G. Barker
Attorney at Law
115 East Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Lee Allen Richards
975 East 400 South, #4
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Jose Arellano Jiminez
1156 Emery Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Brett M. Pedersen
1578 West e ecret Garden Place
#226 Building I
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Kevin McCusker
3671 South 2200 West, #3
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Cecil B. Pc /ell
665 North . ) West
Salt Lake c- cy, UT

84116

Vernon C. Yarbrough
488 E. Lamborne, #:
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

Lenus Bill Feller
472 E. Granite Ave., #3
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Salt Lake City, UT 84104

Dated this 15th day of September, 1994.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
:
HUMAN SERVICES. OFFICE OF RECOVERY
SERVICES, and CHILD SUPPORT
:
ENFORCEMENT,
Plaintiffs and Appellant
and Appellee,

:

v.

:

LEE ALLEN RICHARDS, ET AL.,

Case No. 930654-CA
Priority 15

Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT ORS
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of these consolidated appeals is conferred byUtah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1993).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The

following

statutes

and

determination of these appeals:

rules

are

relevant

to

the

Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp.

1993); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-6
(1992) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-8, -9 (1992) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 7845a-2, -5 (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-9-121 (1989); and Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1993).

The full text of these provisions is

set forth as Addendum A to this brief.
ISSUE PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does a circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction of an
independent civil action to collect past due child support ordered
by a district court in a divorce, support, or paternity action?

This

issue

presents

a

question

correctness with no deference accorded

of

law,

reviewed

for

to the trial court's

determination. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993);

Rimensburaer v. Rimensburger.

841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah App. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
These civil actions were filed in the Third Circuit Court,
West Valley Department, by Child Support Enforcement, a private
collection agency, to collect past due sums of unpaid child
support1 from defendants. Richards R. 1; Jiminez R. 1-2; Pedersen
R. 1-25; McCusker R. 1-27; Powell R. 1-2; Yarbough R. 1-2, 4;
Feller R. 45.

The defendants are all noncustodial parents whose

monthly child support obligations (or other required payments in
the nature of support) have been fixed and ordered by a Utah
district court judge in the context of either a divorce or a
paternity proceeding.

Richards R. 1 (divorce); Jiminez R. 1-2

(divorce); Pedersen R. 1-2

(divorce); McCusker R. 1 (divorce);

Powell R. 1-2 (divorce); Yarbrough R. 1-2, 4 (paternity); Feller R.
1-2 (divorce).
At CSE's request, appellant Office of Recovery Services
("ORS") was ordered joined as a party plaintiff in each action
pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9(2)

(1992) because the

custodial parent, CSE's purported assignor, had received public

x

In each case, the complaint sought less than the circuit
court jurisdictional cap of $20,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7
(Supp. 1993) .
2

assistance from the State of Utah.2 Richards R. 18; Jiminez R. 24;
Pedersen R. 27-29; McCusker R. 26; Powell R. 20; Yarbrough R. 26;
Feller R. 20. In each case, ORS opposed compulsory joinder on the
basis that the circuit court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
enforce a claim for past due child support ordered by a district
court.

Richards R.* 22-28; Jiminez R. 43-46; Pedersen R. 30-34;

McCusker R. 29-33; Powell R. 23-27; Yarbrough R. 34-38; Feller R.
21-24.

The circuit court rejected this argument, concluding that

it has subject matter jurisdiction over actions to enforce district
court orders for child support once payment is past due. Richards
R. 38-40; Jiminez R. 54-56; Pedersen R. 45-47; McCusker R. 41-43;
Powell R. 23-27; Yarbrough R. 34-38; Feller R. 21-24.
After a consolidated hearing, Circuit Court Judge Edward
Watson delivered the oral ruling on the jurisdictional issue that
was relied upon in each of the cases.

Tr. of July 29, 1993 in

State of Utah v. Richards. He concluded that once a court-ordered
child

support

payment

or

other

court-ordered

payment

by

a

noncustodial parent is past due, it changes from a child support

2

Section 78-45-9(2) provides:

(2)(a) A person may not commence any action or file a
pleading to establish or modify a support obligation or
to recover support due or owing, whether under this
chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is
commenced or the pleading is filed stating whether public
assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a
dependent child of the person commencing the action or
filing the pleading.
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided,
that person shall join the [Office of Recovery Services]
as a party to the action.
3

obligation into a "debt" owed by the noncustodial parent.

Such a

debt, he reasoned, can be sued on in the circuit court just like
any other debt, even though it arises from a district court order
in a prior divorce or paternity action.

Judge Watson concluded

circuit court has concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the
district court to enforce such district court orders by way of a
money judgment in an independent civil action in circuit court for
past due sums, as long as the amount claimed is below the circuit
court's monetary jurisdictional ceiling.
(attached

as Addendum

"decline[d]

B) .

jurisdiction

However,

to determine

Tr. at 25-26, 28, 32
Judge Watson
anything

about

expressly
ongoing

support or to become involved in visitation, contempt, or [a
defendant's reasons for] failure to pay [support] in the past, or
to alter in any way a decree of divorce," deferring to the district
court's statutory jurisdiction of those matters.

Id. at 26.

Following involuntary joinder of ORS, money judgments (ranging
from $930 to $15,700) were eventually entered in the Third Circuit
Court in favor of CSE and against defendant in each case for past
due child support or other district court-ordered payments, accrued
interest, and court costs. Richards R. 47; Jiminez R. 61; Pedersen
R. 55; McCusker R. 47; Powell R. 51; Yarbough R. 58; Feller R. 45.
ORS timely appealed from the judgments in order to obtain from
this Court a resolution of the important jurisdictional question.3
3

The related issue of whether the custodial parent's right to
enforce a district court's child support order can be assigned to
a third party other than ORS is already before this Court in State
ex. rel. Parker v. Ferran, No. 930033-CA, currently on temporary
remand to district court for entry of findings and conclusions.
4

Richards R. 54-55; Jiminez R. 64-65;, Pedersen R. 61-62; McCusker
R. 56-57; Powell R. 54-55; Yarbough R. 60-62; Feller R. 51-52. The
seven cases were subsequently consolidated on appeal as State v.
Richards. No. 930654-CA.4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Legislature has expressly barred the circuit courts
from considering claims for unpaid child support that arise from a
district court's order in a divorce, support, or paternity action.
Those actions are wisely centralized by the legislature under the
exclusive

jurisdiction

of

the

district

courts,

which

have

continuing jurisdiction to oversee the collection of past due child
support that they have originally ordered after taking into account
all the circumstances of the parties.
In these consolidated cases, the circuit court erroneously
concluded that once payment is past due, a claim for monthly child
support is severed from the original district court action from
which the support order arose, becoming instead a generic "debt" to
the custodial parent. Such a debt can be sued on in an independent
civil action in circuit court, according to the circuit court, if
the total claim is less than that court's monetary jurisdictional
cap; however, no defenses to the "debt" obligation can be litigated
in circuit court.
This Court should reject the trial court's conclusion on both
4

Another, as yet unconsolidated, ORS appeal from the same
ruling by Circuit Court Judge William A. Thorne on the
jurisdictional issue is pending before this Court in State of Utah,
Dep't of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services and Child
Support Enforcement v. Cordova. No. 930804-CA.
5

statutory and public policy grounds.

A claim for child support

that arises from a prior district court order does not lose its
nature as such the moment it becomes past due. The subject matter
of the action is still child support, over which only the district
courts have jurisdiction under Utah law.
In addition to being prohibited by Utah's statutory scheme,
the splintering of a continuing claim for monthly, district courtordered child support into multiple causes of action in multiple
courts and court systems would be contrary to sensible public
policy.

It would increase the costs of child support litigation

for all parties, including the State, waste judicial resources, and
add confusion to the collection process, further thwarting all
efforts to assure that natural parents financially provide for
their children.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH LAW VESTS THE DISTRICT COURT WITH
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR PAST
DUE CHILD SUPPORT ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT,
AND IT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS THE CIRCUIT COURT
FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CLAIMS.

The jurisdictional limits of a statutorily-created court, such
as

the

circuit

court,

are

circumscribed

by

its

empowering

legislation. R, v. Whitmer In and For Salt Lake County, 30 Utah 2d
206, 515 P.2d 617 (1973); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232
(Utah App. 1987).
court

is without

Without jurisdiction over the subject matter, a
authority

to proceed

to

the merits

of

a

controversy, and any judgment or order entered by that court is
null and void.

Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232; Van Per Stappen v. Van
6

Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah App. 1991).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (1992), the district
court has broad "original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited
by law." Accord Herzoa v. Bramwell. 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345, 348
(1933).

No such broad authority has been conferred, by Utah's

Constitution

or statutes, upon the circuit

courts.

On the

contrary, the Utah Legislature has substantially restricted, by
subject matter as well as by amount in controversy, the circuit
court's authority to entertain civil actions:
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and
equity, in all matters if the sum claimed in less than
$20,000 . . . except:
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
. . . and
(6) in all other actions, where, by statute, jurisdiction
is exclusively vested in the district court or other
trial or appellate court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
Further demonstrating the clear legislative intent to withhold
from circuit courts any authority to consider child support claims
regardless of amount, every statute relating to the imposition of
or enforcement of a parent's obligation to support his or her child
vests exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 to -37 (provision of statute regulating
divorce proceedings, section 30-3-5, gives district court authority
to enter orders relating to child support as well as continuing
jurisdiction to modify such orders); Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-1 to -12 (section 78-45-6
7

grants district court jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under
this act) ; Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l to
-17 (under section 78-45a-5(l), district court has jurisdiction of
an action to establish paternity and power to enforce a judgment
for child support, with continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke
such judgment) ; Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 to -39 (section 77-31-10 vests jurisdiction of
all proceedings under this act in the district court) ; see also
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(1)(a) (Supp. 1993) (each payment under
a child support order is, on and after the date due, "a judgment
with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district
court"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) (each court has power to
enforce its own judgments or orders in pending cases); Public
Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-301 to -504
(1993) (authorizing enforcement of ORS's administrative support
order, under section 62A-11-311(1) , by filing an abstract of it
"with the clerk of any district court in the state").
Thus, section 78-4-7(2) expressly prohibits the circuit court
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that arise from actions
for divorce or paternity, which are different vehicles for securing
court orders that mandate payment of child support by natural
parents.5

In addition, the other statutes cited affirmatively

5

Utah's prohibition of circuit courts from enforcing child
support orders, or other financial obligations arising from a
divorce or paternity action is apparently typical. See 67A C.J.S.
Parent and Child § 80 at 402 (1978) (absent statutory
authorization, courts of limited jurisdiction may not enforce
provisions of separation agreements, divorce decrees, or judgments
of paternity and may not compel payment of child support or grant
8

place exclusive jurisdiction over claims for child support in the
district

courts--whether they arise there in the context of

divorce,

support,

or

paternity

proceedings--thereby

creating

another insurmountable bar to circuit court jurisdiction over such
claims by virtue of section 78-4-7(6).
II.

A CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT--FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE CIRCUIT COURT'S
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION--CEASE BEING PART
OF THAT DISTRICT COURT ACTION ONCE THE
PAYMENTS BECOME PAST DUE.

Notwithstanding

this

comprehensive

statutory

scheme

for

handling child support matters only in the district courts,6 the
circuit court determined it could concurrently exercise a limited
form of subject matter jurisdiction over some claims for child
support by distinguishing between future and past due child
support.

The court ignored the plain language of both exceptions

to circuit court jurisdiction in section 78-4-7 by erroneously
characterizing district court-ordered child support payments--once
past due--as no longer part of the district court divorce or
paternity action in which the child support orders were entered.
Tr. of July 29, 1993 at 25, 29.

Instead, monthly child support

payments transform on their due dates from child support claims

money judgments for past support expenditures).
6

CSE has agreed before this Court that the statutes give
district court sole subject matter jurisdiction over claims for
past due child support. Brief of Appellant CSE at 22-25, State ex
rel. Parker v. Ferran. 930033-CA; see note 3, supra.
CSE
nonetheless continues to argue the opposite view in the circuit
courts. E.g., Richards R. 30-33.

9

into ordinary "debts" for a fixed amount, collectable in a circuit
court action like any other contractual debt, as long as the sum
claimed is less than the circuit court's monetary jurisdictional
ceiling.

Tr. at 25.7

The sole basis for this transmogrification of the child
support obligation is the following language in Baggs v. Anderson,
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added):
[S]upport money can fall into two separate categories:
First, the current and ongoing right of a child to
receive support money from his father (parent); and
second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of
a child after that has been done. As to the second,
suppose a father (parent) fails over a period of time to
furnish support of the child, and the mother, or someone
else furnishes it. That person then has a right to claim
reimbursement from the parent, the same as any other past
debt. This right of reimbursement belongs to whoever
Tsicl furnished the support; and it is subject to
negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the
same manner as any other debt.
See Tr. at 25.

This dicta does not support the circuit court's

ruling on the jurisdictional issue here.

As is evident from the

complaints and other pleadings filed in the instant cases, these
are not independent actions for reimbursement of past support
supplied.

These are actions seeking to enforce district court

7

Unlike defendants in other civil actions to collect a debt,
however, a defendant in a child support debt action would not be
permitted to litigate any reasons for failure to pay the past due
support, such as nonoccurrence of a necessary condition precedent.
Tr. at 25-26; see, e.g., Yarbrough R. 5-6 (support order in
paternity judgment requires defendant to pay $104 each month, minus
monthly health/dental insurance premium actually paid, plus onehalf the work related child care costs actually incurred by
custodial parent). In the view of Judge Watson, matters such as
contempt, custody, visitation, or alterations in the amount of
support ordered remained in the district court, which may require
"transfer" of the circuit court action to district court. Tr. at
26, 32.
10

support orders that inextricably remain parts of the original
divorce or paternity proceedings, over which the district courts
have original and continuing jurisdiction.

See Utah Code Ann. §

30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-5(l) (Supp. 1993);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) (each court has power to compel
compliance with its own judgments and orders in pending cases).
The characterization of unpaid, district court-ordered child
support as a "debt" owed to a support provider is irrelevant to
resolution of the jurisdictional issue. Describing accrued child
support as a debt does not change the fact that the subject matter
of an action on such a debt is child support ordered by a district
court, a matter over which section 78-4-7 precludes the circuit
court from exercising any jurisdiction.8
In Herzog. 23 P.2d at 347-48, the Utah Supreme Court held in
a mandamus action that the district court must assume jurisdiction
over a petition to enforce the alimony payment terms of a prior
district court divorce decree, even though resolution of the
petition would require the district court to rule on the validity
of the parties' purported post-decree contractual settlement of
those past due alimony claims.

ff

[A] district court, having

acquired jurisdiction of subject-matter and of the parties, has
jurisdiction in the same action of all disputes and controversies
presented by the pleadings arising out of or connected with the
8

The Public Support of Children Act, which authorizes ORS to
enter administrative judgments for past due child support and then
abstract them in the district court, likewise uses the term
"support debt" to mean "the debt created by nonpayment of support."
Utah Code Ann. § 62A 11-303(19) (1993).
11

same subject-matter of the action."
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841, 843

Id. at 348; accord Emrich v.

(D.C. Cir. 1942)

(district court's

jurisdiction over parties' prior divorce continued so that it, not
inferior court, had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
subsequent child support claim).
This Court should similarly hold that child support claims
arising out of or connected with original divorce, support, or
paternity

proceedings

in

district

court

must,

under

Utah's

statutory scheme, be settled in the context of the prior judicial
action in district court, not in an independent action in circuit
court.

The circuit court's intervention orders and judgments

should, accordingly, be vacated as null and void.
This result is compelled by serious practical and public
policy concerns as well as by the cited statutes.

The ruling of

the circuit court in the instant cases hopelessly fractionalizes a
single domestic proceeding (for divorce, support, or paternity) in
one district court into multiple causes of action that can be filed
in numerous circuit courts. Under Judge Watson's reasoning, each
past due monthly payment of court-ordered support during a child's
years of minority can be a separate debt action in a circuit court,
filed by the custodial parent and/or by ORS.9

(On the other hand,

either the custodial parent or ORS may elect to accumulate claims

9

Utah law grants ORS standing, independent of the custodial
parent's, to enforce the right to child support as an initiating or
intervening party in a divorce, support, or paternity proceeding
against the support obligor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9 (1992) ; id. ,
§ 78-45a-2 (1992); i ^ , § 78-45a-5 (Supp. 1993); id^ § 62A-11-104
(1993) .
12

for more than $20,000 in support arrearages, in which case Judge
Watson's ruling would apparently require the filing of a new,
independent "debt" action in district court, not circuit court.)
However, if the custodial parent or ORS wants a court to hold the
obligor in contempt for failure to pay child support, s/he or ORS
must go back to the original action in district court.

If the

obligor wants to claim that, for any reason, s/he doesn't owe the
past due support, see note 7 supra. s/he must convince the circuit
court to "transfer" the case to district court, an act not even
authorized by law, in order to litigate these matters.
This fractionalization of what is, essentially, a single--but
ongoing--cause of action for child support is nonsensical. It also
needlessly increases the costs of support litigation for the
parties, including both parents and ORS, who must appear and
respond in two (or more) separate forums in multiple lawsuits.
Permitting a new and separate action in circuit court to enforce a
district court's prior support order, in contravention of section
78-7-5(4),10

also

wastes

public

judicial

resources

through

duplicative filings in separate courts and court systems.
Other practical considerations militate against recognizing
any concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court over child support
matters. For example, support obligors (or their garnishees) would
be subject to multiple, potentially overlapping post-judgment
garnishment or attachment orders or judgment liens emanating from
10

The statute gives each court authority "to compel obedience
to its judgments, orders, or process . . . in a pending action or
proceeding." (Emphasis added).
13

two different court systems.
any

such

circuit

court

There is no method for reconciling

judgments

and post-judgment

judicial

remedies relating to past-due support with those entered in the
original district court action or with those abstracted in district
court as ORS's administrative child support orders. Thus, it will
be nearly impossible for either court, or for ORS, the custodial
parent, or the support obligor to keep track accurately of what
months of support have been reduced to a court judgment or a courtabstracted agency order, as well as what months of arrearages have
or have not been paid up.

This chaos will, in turn, further

handicap efforts to collect child support from delinquent parents.
Just as importantly, a district court in a divorce, support,
or paternity action, in exercise of its continuing jurisdiction and
its authority to enforce its own judments or orders, must be able
to enter judgments for support arrearages and subsequent equitable
orders concerning execution on those judgments after taking a
holistic view of the parties' obligations, duties, interests, and
resources. For example, a district court may stay execution on its
judgment for past due support as long as the obligor of limited
means timely pays ongoing child support plus an extra amount each
month toward the arrearages. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491
P.2d 231 (1971) (district court exercising continuing jurisdiction
in divorce action has discretion to restrict execution on judgments
for support arrearages to prevent the destruction of the means for
payment of ongoing support).

Similar authority and flexibility is

given to the district court in support and paternity actions. Utah
14

Code Ann. § 78-45-8

(1992) (under Uniform Civil Liability for

Support Act, district court retains jurisdiction to modify or
vacate orders of support "where justice requires"); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45a-5(l)

(Supp. 1993)

(under Uniform Act

on Paternity,

district court has continuing jurisdiction "to modify or revoke a
judgment for . . . " necessary support") .

In one of the instant

cases, for example, the district court's paternity judgment and
decree permitted the natural father to pay accrued child support by
a future date certain, after which a district court judgment could
be taken against him if the full amount was not paid. Yarbrough R.
5If an obligee is permitted to obtain from circuit court a
rubber-stamped circuit judgment for an excised period of past due
child support, the district courts in the original proceedings will
lose this essential flexibility and will, in effect, be divested of
their statutory powers to make equitable orders regarding support
of a child and to compel compliance with their own orders and
judgments.
In light of such realities, the appellate court in Emrich
sagely determined that sound public policy required a district
court with original jurisdiction over a parties' divorce--not an
inferior municipal court in an independent action--to resolve all
post-decree child support claims.

126 F.2d at 844.

In reaching

this conclusion, the court aptly noted, "No advantage to the
parents, to the minor child, or to the well being of the people of
the District could be accomplished by permitting such splitting up
15

of issues . . . ."

Id. at 845.

In sum, the circuit court's exercise of limited, concurrent
jurisdiction

over child

support

collection in Utah would be

contrary to current law and would constitute undesirable public
policy that would further hinder recovery of support from natural
parents, adding confusion and cost to an already complicated area.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ORS requests that this Court vacate
the final judgments and intervention orders appealed from as null
and void, and remand these cases to the Third Circuit Court with
instructions that the complaints be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted this %tk/ day of April 1994.
•
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ADDENDUM A:

Text of Relevant Statutes

78-4-7

dOOOO(

History: C. 1953,7Mg-103, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 173, S 4.
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-278 provides
that the Citizen Review Panel Pilot Project is
repealed April 1, 1995.

COG CCCM
" C 0 ^ C C- •
COGCCGI

eiccci
: c c : c.3«
otoceci

JUDICIAL CODE
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 173, * 6
makes the act effective on July 1, 1993.

CHAPTER 4
CIRCUIT COURTS
Section
78-4-7.
78-4-11.

Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions.
Appeals to Court of Appeals —
Prosecuting attorney to represent state — City attorney to
represent municipality.

Section
78-4-19.
78-4-23.
78-4-24.

Repealed.
Remission of monies collected.
Repealed.

78-4*7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions.
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, interest, and
attorney fees, except:
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding
actions to foreclose mechanics liens;
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-7, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend1977, ch. 77,1 1; 1983, ch. 76, t 1; 1986, ch. ment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "inter121, I 1; 1988, ch. 248, i 31; 1991, ch. 268, est, and attorney fees'* in the undesignated inI 31; 1992, ch. 127, f 13.
troductory language.

otooool
lOOGGOi
GlCCCii
COCGCCi

cmcocoi
Ciecrti
-©©GGG-Cj

78-4*11. Appeals to Court of Appeals — Prosecuting attorney to represent state — City attorney to represent municipality.
Except as otherwise directed by Section 78-2*2, appealsfromfinal civil and
criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The
county attorney or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and
17-18-1.7 shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any
appeals of criminal matters prosecuted by the county attorney in the circuit
court. City attorneys shall represent the interests of the state in any appeals
of criminal matters prosecuted by the city attorney and the interests of municipalities in any appeals involving violations of municipal ordinances.

54

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES

78-7-5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 36. oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to
PU
CJ.S. - 21 CJ.S. Courts J 121.
^C'JM^*,4-76,-,
•
Prejudicial effect of improper failure to exf
AX.R. — Effect of witness' violation of order eludefromcourtroom or to sequester or sepaof exclusion, 14 AX.R.3d 16.
rate state's witnesses in criminal case, 74
Standing of media representatives or organi- A.L.R.4th 705.
xations to seek review of, or to intervene to
Key Numbers. — Courts *» 79.

78-7-5. Powers of every court
Every court has authority to:
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person authorized to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the
orders of a judge out of court, in a pending action or proceeding;
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in *ny manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it in every matter;
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or
proceeding, as provided by law;
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties;
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and
justice;
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent
with law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; C. 1943,
Cross-References. — Acknowledgments,
Supp., 104*7-5; L. 1988, ch. 248, t 41.
power to take, § 57-2a-3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendContempt generally, § 78-32-1 et seq.
znent, effective April 25, 1988, added SuhsecPower to solemnize marriages, § 30-1-6.
tion (10) and made minor stylistic changes
Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6.
throughout.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Vacating orders.
and cannot be vacated by the order of another
Order of district courtfinding"mother in con- district judge nine years later. Peterson v. Petempt and suspending child support is valid terson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 3d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts i 64
et seq.
CJ.S. — 17 CJ.S. Contempt § 43.
AXJL — Interference with enforcement of
judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent
case as contempt, 8 A.L.R.3d 657.
Release of information concerning forthcom-

ing or pending trial as ground for contempt
proceedings or other disciplinary measures
against member of the bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 1104.
Appealability of acquittalfromor dismissal
ofchargeofcontemptofcourt, 24 A.L.R.3d650.
Appealability of contempt adjudication or
conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448.
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78-45-5

JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as
defined in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee.
History: L. 1957, eh. 110, 8 5.
Meaning of "tbis act" — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion
and Nonsupport §§ 32, 95.

Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife •» 4;
Parent and Child *» 3.1(5).

78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under
this act.
History: L. 1957, cb. 110, ( 6.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, t 78-3-4.

Meaning of "this act" — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 147
et seq.
Key Numbers. — Courts •» 156.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines
before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may
be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
660

UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-9

78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support
where justice requires.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, S 8.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, § 78-3-4.

78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Human Services or any
other department or agency of this state that provides public assistance,
as defined by Subsection 62A-11«303(3), to enforce the right to recover
public assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right
of support against the obligor.
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the
obligee to represent the office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to establish or modify a support obligation or to recover support due or owing,
whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced or the
pleading is filed stating whether public assistance has been or is being
provided on behalf of a dependent child of the person commencing the
action or filing the pleading.
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided, that person shall
join the office as a party to the action. The office shall be represented as
provided in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) As used in this section "office" means the Office of Recovery Services
within the Department of Human Services.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, $ 9; 1975, ch. 96,
I 23; 1977, ch, 145, § 11; 19S2, ch, 63, § 2;
1989, ch. 62, § 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, designated the
first sentence of Subsection (1) as (l)(a) and
rewrote the provision which read: T h e obligee
may enforce his right of support against the
obligor and the state Department of Social Services may proceed pursuant to this act or any
other applicable statute, either on its behalf or
on behalf of the obligee to enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor"; designated the second sentence of Subsection (1) as
(1Kb) and substituted "office" for "state department of social services" and "the office" for
"that department" therein; designated the first
sentence of Subsection (2) as (2)(a) and rewrote
the provision which read: "No obligee shall
commence any action to recover support due or

owing that obligee whether under this act or
any other applicable statute without first filing
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced stating whether that obligee has received public assistance from any
source"; designated the second and third sentences of Subsection (2) as (2)(b) and rewrote
the provision which read: "If the obligee has
received public assistance, the obligee shall
join the Department of Social Services as a
party plaintiff in the action. The Department
of Social Services shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1) of this section"; and
added Subsection (3).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Human Services" for "Social
Services" in Subsections (l)(a) and (3).
Cross-References. — Enforcement of support provisions by Department of Human Services, § 62A-1-111.
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-2

78-45a-2. Enforcement.
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same
or other proceedings:
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have famished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 168, S 2; 1990, eh.
245, 5 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "putative father" in the first sentence and made
minor stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-

sions by Department of Human Services,
§ 62A-M11.
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties
of Department of Human Services in collecting
child support, § 62A-11-104.
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-332.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to counsel.

ANALYSIS

Estoppel and laches.
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Right to counsel.
—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
Discretion of court.
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
Estoppel and laches.
Under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
A paternity action brought six years after
the birth of the child was not barred by laches,
where defendant made no factual showing to
support his argument that he was prejudiced
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d
144 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Where child was conceived while mother was
married to her first husband and born while
she was married to her second husband, the
child was legitimate whichever husband was
the father, and testimony by mother that disputed second husband's fatherhood and supported first husband's fatherhood would not
illegitimize the child and was properly admissible in paternity action against first husband.
Roods v. Roods, 645 P^d 640 (Utah 1982).

—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
While due process does not require Utah to
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be
some complicated paternity suits in which the
risks of error would be high enough that the
presumption against the right to appointed
counsel would be overcome; given the availability and quality of the blood tests, there is
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
——Discretion of court
Due process of law does not require that all
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity
actions must always be appointed counsel;
whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
The applicable standard of proof where paternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-5

78-45a-5. Remedies.
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or fiineral expenses
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available
for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the
state Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or
in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to
enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department, all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable
to this chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Department of Human Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the
county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that
department.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96,
! 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, guhstituted
"Human Services" for "Social Services" twice
in Subsection (2).
Meaning of "this a c t " — See note under
same catchdine following § 78-45a-4.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support A c t — The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, referred to in the
last sentence in Subsection (1), is Chapter 31 of
Title 77.

Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 45b of this
title, referred to in Subsection (2), was repealed
by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-301 through
62A-11-328.
Cross-References. — Creation of Department of Human Services, { 62A-1-102.
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1.
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1.
General jurisdiction of district court,
i 78-3-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction.

Interests of mother and state.
Jurisdiction.
—Minority of putative father.
Powers of the court.
Interests of mother and state.
In an action pursuant to the Uniform Act on
Paternity, the state has a separate interest
from that of the mother. The state and the
mother are not in privity because each has separate interests and legal rights over which the
other has no control. State ex rel. State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah
C t App. 1987).

—Minority of putative father.
District court, and not the juvenile court, has
jurisdiction over action brought under the Urnform Act on Paternity, when the putative father is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Dick, 684 P.2d 42 (Utah
1984).
Powers of the c o u r t
The Uniform Paternity Act does not endow a
district court with subject matter jurisdiction
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to
permanently relieve a parent of his or her support obligations. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d
1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

62A-9-121

(3) For the purpose of providing assistance to persons subjected to extraordinary problems of living, by reason of any special situation,
monthly payments may be made within rules devised to meet those situations, such as an allowance to meet the special needs of pregnant women.
(4) Because of the unpredictability of public assistance and medical
benefits, the governor is authorized to supplement the annual appropriation at the close of any fiscal year for medical benefits or public assistance, by deficit spending in an amount not exceeding 2% of the total
work program of federal and state funds allocated for thefiscalyear; and
the Legislature, at its next annual general session, shall appropriate any
supplemental funds that the governor may have authorized for medical
benefits or public assistance.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-119, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 236; 1988, ch. 242, S 24.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Provision of former statute whereby larger
families were paid disproportionately smaller
percentage of actual need than smaller families was consistent with the Social Security Act

and not invidious discrimination in violation of
equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution. Utah Welfare Rights Org. v. Lindsay, 315 F. Supp. 294
(D. Utah 1970).

62A-9-120. Calculation of General Assistance Grants.
Grants for General Assistance made pursuant to Subsections 62A-9-114(2)
and (3), to the extent that those payments are made on an ongoing basis for
persons who are unemployable, shall be calculated in a manner analogous to
that provided in Subsections 62A-9-119Q), (2), and (3). However, the ratable
reduction for General Assistance may differfromthat imposed on other programs.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-120, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 237; 1988, ch. 242, fi 25.

62A-9-121. Assignment of support.
(1) The department shall accept an assignment of supportfromeach applicant or recipient regardless of whether its payment is court ordered. Any right
to support from any other person which has accrued at the time the assignment is executed or, if none is executed, at the time of application for assistance, and which an applicant or recipient has in his own behalf, or in behalf
of any other family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying
for or receiving assistance, passes to the department under the assignment or
by operation of law upon the receipt of assistance by the recipient, even if the
recipient has not executed and delivered an assignment to the department.
(2) An assignment of support or a passing of rights by operation of law shall
include payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court within this state,
any other state, or territory of the United States and is not in lieu of, and shall
not supersede or alter, any other court order, decree, or judgment.
(3) When an assignment is executed, the applicant or recipient is entitled to
regular monthly assistance and the support paid the department is a refund.
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DIVORCE

30-3-5

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23, 1990.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Division of debts
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification [Effective until
January 1, 1994].
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children; and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) TTie court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
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ADDENDUM B:

Transcript of Bench Ruling

recalcitrant parent, under the order of the district
court, has failed to do so.

That is the factual

situation that is brought to this court in most of the
cases.
The Court is aware of the letter from Judge Murphy.
And I can say on my own that when I first reviewed these
cases I had a little bit of concern myself.

And I

directed Mr. Johnston to show to me what authority he
had to bring it into the circuit court.
a memorandum.

And so he filed

I reviewed it, and then these matters

were set as they are.
This Court finds that —

and concludes from the

factual situation, the memorandums submitted and the
argument, that the circuit court does have subject
matter jurisdiction over a child support obligation
ordered by the district court that is past due.
Court is making a distinction as —

The

and consistent with

that, which is arrived at in the case cited by the
plaintiff of Baggs vs. Anderson, and makes that same
distinction between an ongoing order of support and a
past order that has not been paid.
The Court concludes that such is a debt, can be
recovered in a monetary court of jurisdiction, as is the
court court, as any other debt may be.

That in these

cases where the custodial parent, who has not been
25
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provided child support as ordered by the district court
has provided that support, or any other third person who
.has done so, they may bring an action in the circuit
court on a debt that is due and recovered.
This Court declines jurisdiction to determine
anything about ongoing support or to become involved in
visitation, contempt, or failure to pay it in the past,
or to alter in any way a decree of divorce, this Court
recognizing that the district court has the jurisdiction
in those matters.
Mr. Welker, you raised the issue that there may be
a situation arise, and may have done in your case,
wherein the custodial parent has denied the obligor
parent visitation rights, and thus has not paid the
child support.

I can see that occurring.

But it is the

opinion of this Court if that does occur, the situation
is not to pay, but to pay into court, into the district
court, the child support, and then to bring an action in
re contempt for failure to provide visitation.
And so there is a remedy to cover that situation.
And so this Court is concluding that any matters
relating to interchange of parties, visitation,
contempt, custody, any of those kinds of issues remain
in the district court.

The Court finds that in no

instance in any of these cases has the plaintiff, Child
26
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Support Enforcement, brought its action under the child
support enforcement provisions of the state law.
MR. WELKER:

Your Honor, excuse me if I may.

I

have reviewed that in the action in the Guild case
paragraph 14 there is a reference in the citation to the
Section 78-45-9 of the act.

And I'm assuming what

they're saying here is that they are complying with the
act by providing an affidavit, which certainly indicates
that they are bringing the action under the act.
THE COURT:

It raises the support —

I'm

referring to that case in particular, paragraph 14 of
the complaint, the support of the foregoing periods of
time was not provided by the State of Utah or any public
assistance program.

An affidavit of that custodial

parent is required by Utah (inaudible) Section 7 8-45
(inaudible) is attached here to, and by this reference
(inaudible).
I am assuming what he is saying there, the way I
read that, it's not that he's bringing this action under
that particular act, but they had —
has —

his client assignee

assignor has filed an affidavit saying that the

state was not to be joined because they did not receive
public assistance.

I don't think —

and I don't read

that as meaning they are bringing it under this act.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

That is correct, your
27

Kelly Hollenbeck - Rocky Mountain Reporting

Honor.
THE COURT:

That's how I read that paragraph.

SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

I —

I read it differently

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

I understand.

The Court therefore

finds that the circuit court does have juris ~
matter jurisdiction in this case.
the State of Utah are granted.

subject

The motions to join

These matters will then

be set for hearing.
MS. DIXON:
questions.

Tour Honor, excuse me, two

Why would the state be joined if they're not

child support?
THE COURT:

Pardon?

MS. DIXON:

Why would the State of Utah be

joined if it's not

—

THE COURT:
be joined.

I said that the state may wish to

And that's the reason I told Mr. Johnston he

had to join them, because you may have some claim
against the —

the custodial parent for reimbursement.

And you may want to have input into the action to have
part of that judgment awarded to you to recover what you
may have expended during the period of time when she's
not actually recovering.
Most of these cases came to this Court on this
basis.

An affidavit was signed by the custodial parent
28
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that during a period of time from say January 1, 19 9 3 to
July 1, 1993, the custodial parent was not receiving
welfare assistance.

And so this claim filed in the

circuit court was to recover the debt for that period of
time.
My position was even though you are saying during
that small frame of time your client —

assignor was not

on welfare assistance, the State of Utah (inaudible)
still have a claim, if it had provided assistance in the
past.

Because you may have signed —

you as assignor

may have signed a document that says any moneys we
recover we will reimburse the state.

And that's why I#m

saying you are joined.
And I know that looks a little bit inconsistent,
but I'm saying this is not support because the debt
arises from the support obligation.

If you choose not

to want to be joined and to ask for that, then you may
simply file documents saying we are aware we have no
claim, you may proceed without us.
MS. DIXON:

Tour Honor, we have asked in each

of these cases not to be joined, and if the Court has
deemed them to be merely a debt, not to be part of the
action.

The difficulty for the state is then we become

subject to two forums, and we end up in two different
forums trying to adjudicate the same issues essentially.
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As is being indicated in testimony today, some of
these cases we are presently enforcing the current
obligation, and there is no assignment to CSE for
periods in which the obligor is not paying after the
ongoing (inaudible).
So there will be additional —

or potentially can

be additional arrearages that will accrue that we will
have the responsibility to go in and get on behalf of
the obligee.

And it will be very difficult for us if we

end up in two forums•
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

Your Honor, I think that

matter can easily be remedied by the state simply filing
a waiver reciting to them that they do not have a claim
for X period to T period (inaudible).
MS. DIXON:

My apologies, your Honor, but we

definitely do not want to file a waiver.

Sometimes we

do not have all the pleadings, sometimes we do not have
adequate information to know whether or not we do have a
claim.

And I don't want to file anything or have any

type of waived right of the state with inaccurate
information.
The other concern I would express to the Court, and
just to express a clarification of the Court's
determination today, 30-3-10.6 is the provision
regarding the automatic nature of judgments in this
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particular arena.

I would like to know, is

it the

Court's determination then, when a child support
obligation is due, that without a proceeding in which
the Court has in fact adjudicated the amount, will CSE
be entitled to come to the circuit court, or will they
have to obtain an adjudicated amount or the obligee
obtain that amount before (inaudible)?
THE COURT:

I will more specifically address

US* DIXON:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

The consideration of this Court

that.

will be that the plaintiff here will not have to reduce
the past child support to judgment in the district court
before he may proceed in this court.

And I know there

are some problems that will have to be worked out, but
that is the position of this Court.

And I guess we'll

have to take it (inaudible).
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

Tour Honor, again on

(inaudible) and I'm not sure exactly what the Court
means, but in the event that we have some defense to -that's not particularly a monetary defense, withholding
visitation I know the Court indicated that we could go
to district court for the contempt.

Is it the view of

the Court then that we would have an action ongoing in
this court, and then we would also have to take our
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action to district court; or would we take our whole
action to district court to deal with all aspects of the
case?
THE COURT:

I'm not saying that the circuit

court has exclusive jurisdiction.

If there was, as I

view it, a failure to pay child support, and there is
thought in the mind of the defendant some justification
for that, and by affidavit that is presented to this
Court, this Court might be willing to transfer the whole
case to the district court, including the monetary
claim, because of that.

But I can see no reason why a

person should fail to pay the child support without
going to the jurisdiction for a contempt (inaudible)
refusal of visitation.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

But would the Court hear

the defendant's arguments on its merits, or would the
Court feel like it has jurisdiction to do that?
THE COURT:

I would not entertain jurisdiction

to determine contempt.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

And so our procedure then

would be to file something to the court to transfer it
back to district court if we wanted to pursue that?
THE COURT:

I would think that's what would

have to be done.
SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

Thank you.
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